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Abstract
Scenarios are increasingly used to inform global-change debates, but their connection to
decisions has been weak and indirect. This reflects the greater number and variety of potential
users and scenario needs, relative to other decision domains where scenario use is more
established. Global-change scenario needs include common elements, e.g., model-generated
projections of emissions and climate change, needed by many users but in different ways and
with different assumptions. For these common elements, the limited ability to engage diverse
global-change users in scenario development requires extreme transparency in communicating
underlying reasoning and assumptions, including probability judgments. Other scenario needs
are specific to users, requiring a decentralized network of scenario and assessment organizations
to disseminate and interpret common elements and add elements requiring local context or
expertise. Such an approach will make global-change scenarios more useful for decisions, but
not less controversial. Despite predictable attacks, scenario-based reasoning is necessary for
responsible global-change decisions because decision-relevant uncertainties cannot be specified
scientifically. The purpose of scenarios is not to avoid speculation, but to make the required
speculation more disciplined, more anchored in relevant scientific knowledge when available,
and more transparent.
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1. Introduction to scenarios
A scenario is a description of potential future conditions,
developed to inform decision-making under uncertainty
(Parson et al 2007). Scenarios aid decisions by representing
high-stakes uncertainties that cannot be resolved before
choices must be made, but are weakly understood—in that they
cannot adequately be represented by probability distributions
on known parameters, but rather may include the causal factors
shaping environmental or socio-economic outcomes, values at
issue, or the identity and motivations of other actors who can
influence outcomes (Morgan et al 1998, Lempert et al 2006).
The antecedents of modern scenarios lie in war games,
developed as aids for military planning and decision-making,
testing of procedures, and officer training (Brewer and Shubik
1979). In the Cold War era, when nuclear weapons raised
the stakes and expanded the uncertainties of international
conflict, scenarios and related war-game techniques were
first applied outside purely military problems, to study
potential international crises with linked political and military
dimensions. Over the past few decades, scenario use has
broadened further to include strategic planning, analysis,
and assessment by many businesses and other organizations
(Schwartz 1991, Shell International 2003, Van der Heijden
1996). In all these domains, scenarios are used to inform
decisions under uncertainty, especially uncertainties resistant
to formal analytic methods; to scope and explore weakly
understood issues; and to integrate knowledge from diverse
domains.
2. Scenarios in global-change applications
Scenarios are also increasingly used to inform debates and
decisions relevant to management of long-term environmental
© 2008 IOP Publishing Ltd Printed in the UK1
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issues, particularly global climate change1. Prominent
examples of global-change scenarios include those produced
by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(Nakicenovic and Swart 2000), the US National Assessment
of impacts of climate change (NAST 2001), the UK
Climate Impacts Program (UKCIP 1998), and the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2006). Global change’s high
stakes and deep uncertainties make the value of scenarios
here clear, but their use is complicated by large structural
differences between global change and other decision domains
where use of scenarios is more thoroughly established and
studied.
The most important difference concerns the relationship
between scenario producers and potential users. In other
domains such as corporate strategic planning, scenario users
are usually identified, few in number, and fairly similar
in perspectives, often situated within one organization or
a few related ones. Users or their representatives can be
engaged in key stages of scenario creation and application, to
provide input on such matters as relevant choices, high-priority
uncertainties and their plausible realizations, and criteria for
desirable outcomes. Even if users cannot fully agree on these,
they can at least clarify and bound their disagreement. Such
user engagement is generally judged essential to effective use
of scenarios (Van der Heijden 1996).
By contrast, potential users of global-change scenarios
are vast in number and in the variety of their responsibilities,
knowledge, objectives, capabilities, and authority. They
include such disparate groups as economists analyzing optimal
emissions reductions, climate scientists performing model
intercomparisons, assessors of regional and local impacts, and
planners and officials whose decisions will be affected by
climate change, at scales from the local to the global. These
potential users embrace profoundly different views of the
nature of the problem (including whether there is one at all), the
objectives to be pursued, the criteria for desirable outcomes,
the range of appropriate and relevant actions, and the locus of
relevant authority. In many cases, relevant decisions and users
are unidentified or unknown to those creating scenarios.
This breadth of potential uses strongly shapes the
characteristics of global-change scenarios and the obstacles
to their effectiveness. Understanding its implications can
provide guidance for making scenarios more useful, which
may diverge from practice in other domains. The rest of
this paper reviews major characteristics of current global-
change scenarios, assesses how well they serve decisions, and
proposes changes to improve their usefulness.
3. Global-change scenarios—major elements of
current practice
There are four significant differences between scenarios for
global change and in other domains. Global-change scenarios
are mostly produced and used within large-scale, official
1 Any scenarios constructed with this purpose will be referred to here as
‘global-change scenarios’, no matter what mix of socio-economic and bio-
physical conditions they describe.
assessments. They are mostly simple, quantitative, model-
based, and highlight emissions trends and resultant model-
calculated climate change. Their connections to decisions are
usually weak and indirect. And they have been subject to sharp
public controversy2.
The most common and prominent instances of production
and use of global-change scenarios have been in large-
scale official assessments, such as those of the IPCC and
other national and international bodies. Assessments are
processes that summarize and synthesize scientific knowledge
to support decisions (Mitchell et al 2006). Although
assessments can support decisions in many ways, some
of which do not require scenarios, they often include
descriptions of how environmental conditions might evolve
under alternative assumptions of future human drivers, which
do require scenarios. For example, assessments frequently
include comparisons of multiple models’ projections of future
climate change under specified scenarios of future emissions.
These model outputs may then serve as climate scenarios
to provide input to analyses of sea-level rise, changes in
agriculture or ecosystems, or other impacts. Used in this way,
scenarios serve as organizing devices to structure and integrate
multiple areas of an assessment, linking both to downstream
discussions of climate impacts and to upstream discussion of
socio-economic and technological conditions consistent with
specified emissions trajectories.
Scenario-based results are often the most vivid, concrete,
and prominently reported messages from an assessment. They
can attract widespread public attention, framing the issue and
encoding its basic character and severity in public debates.
They thereby escape their creators’ control, e.g., in being put
to uses their creators did not foresee and cannot influence, even
to assure that all linked elements, assumptions, and qualifying
explanations are conveyed and understood.
The characteristics of global-change scenarios are strongly
shaped by their production and use in assessments. Although
scenarios could serve diverse decisions by focusing on
many environmental or socio-economic conditions, they
usually highlight emissions and modeled climate change, the
elements that assessments specifically need. Although the
models used to produce emissions scenarios often involve
sophisticated representations of economic structures and
energy technologies, this complexity is not evident in the
trajectories of emissions and a few aggregate socio-economic
indicators that are the main disseminated outputs of scenarios.
Scenarios are usually global in scale, with detail limited to
major world regions3, the scale of responsibility and assembled
expertise of the assessments that produce them. This scale
influences what characteristics scenarios include, favoring
variables that aggregate easily over those whose specification
and interpretation depend on local knowledge or context.
Relative to scenarios in other domains, global-change
scenarios highlight quantitative elements, usually produced by
formal models or drawn from authoritative external sources.
2 This analysis reflects the collective judgment of the author team of the CSSP
study of global-change scenarios, led by the author (Parson et al 2007).
3 Scenarios whose spatial scale and resolution are fixed by models generating
them, such as global climate models, are an exception.
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Qualitative and narrative elements, if present at all, are less
developed, less prominently reported, and only weakly linked
to quantitative elements. Even when scenario exercises have
begun with narrative scenarios, these have faded in significance
as the exercise proceeded. This tendency may be explained by
two aspects of the assessments that produce and use scenarios.
First, assessments undergo intensive review processes closely
modeled on scientific peer review. Scenarios that appear more
scientific in character and are more familiar to participants
and reviewers pose fewer risks in such a review process. On
the other hand, assessments are not usually linked to any
specific decision or decision-maker, despite their mandate
to inform decision-making in general. While experience
in other domains suggests users want scenarios to include
uncertainties that can only be represented in qualitative or
narrative terms, the weak relationship to particular users means
that such preferences find little voice in global-change scenario
exercises. Rather, the capabilities, needs, and familiar methods
of scenario producers, usually quantitatively oriented analysts
and modelers, are likely to dominate. There have even been
challenges in scenarios meeting the needs of other modelers
within the assessment process who need scenario inputs—the
one type of user specifically identified to scenario developers
(Parson et al 2007, Hulme 2008).
4. Global-change decision-makers and their scenario
needs
Thus far, the connections of scenarios to practical decisions
managing global-change issues have been weak and indirect.
This reflects no particular failure of scenario efforts, as it
follows from the primary use of scenarios in assessments—
themselves usually unconnected to specific decisions—and the
early state of decision agendas. But decision agendas are
advancing rapidly. Proposals to limit emissions are being
proposed in many jurisdictions, and managers in many climate-
sensitive sectors such as water, forests, and coastal zones now
see the need to consider climate in long-range planning and
management. It is thus necessary to ask how well scenarios
serve decisions now or soon on multiple actors’ agendas, and
how their utility can be improved.
To do this, in view of the variety of global-change
decisions, it is first necessary to disaggregate. A preliminary
taxonomy would distinguish three types of decision-makers,
with distinct responsibilities, uncertainties of concern, and
scenario needs: impacts and adaptation managers, national
officials, and energy resource and technology managers.
Impacts and adaptation managers have responsibility
for particular assets, resources, or interests sensitive to
climate. They need scenarios of future climate change,
its impacts in their areas of concern, and factors shaping
their vulnerabilities. Particular actors’ needs will be highly
specific in the characteristics and scale specified. A water-
system planner may need monthly or finer-scale rain and snow
projections over a watershed, while a coastal planner may
need probabilistic projections of sea level, storm intensity and
surge, or saltwater intrusion. These all depend, of course, on
a common core of emissions and climate scenarios, modified
by whatever mitigation efforts are judged likely. It is for this
group that the most effort has been made to provide useful
scenarios. Substantial progress has been made in providing
climate information, through datasets and tools to downscale
model results to impact-relevant scales (e.g., Scheraga 2008),
but other needs—e.g., scenarios of socio-economic conditions
relevant to vulnerability, and methods to integrate climate with
other variables, including local ones—are not well met.
National policy-makers have both adaptation and mitiga-
tion responsibilities. For adaptation decisions, their scenario
needs are similar to those discussed above, aggregated
to national scale. For mitigation decisions, however, in
addition to climate change and national impacts under
specified emissions, they need scenarios of the economic
and political environment of their mitigation choices. This
includes fine-scale description of emissions trends in their
jurisdictions; socio-economic factors that influence emissions
and the cost and effectiveness of mitigation measures; and
the external political and economic setting for their choices,
including actions of other nations. While some jurisdictions
adopting mitigation targets have produced baseline emissions
projections from which effects of policies are measured, there
are as yet no published scenarios that present such broader
context for mitigation choices, including such factors as
disaggregated emissions trends, determinants of mitigation
effectiveness, external policy context, or examination of major
uncertainties.
Energy and technology managers, mostly in the private
sector, include resource producers, investors in energy-
dependent capital such as electrical utilities, and innovators
and investors in energy technologies. For these actors, the
key uncertainties are climate-change policies in force over the
life of proposed investments and research programs, rather
than climate change itself. They need scenarios of alternative
market conditions, technological uncertainties, and policy
regimes, to assess effects on the value of energy and technology
assets. As is the case for national mitigation decisions,
there are presently no published scenarios providing such
information—although in this case, decision-makers may not
wish to publicize scenarios being used to guide their strategies.
How well do present global-change scenarios meet these
needs? Their primary contents—global and major-region
emissions, plus resultant model-generated climate change—
are widely needed by decision-makers, including most or all
impact managers and national officials, and likely to remain
so. But while many users need these core elements, they
need them in different ways for different purposes. Some need
alternative emissions baselines with no incremental mitigation
effort, judged to be low, middle, high, or some extreme ‘worst-
case’. Others need similar scenarios modified by alternative
levels of mitigation effort. For example, impact managers may
wish to embed some assumed distribution of likely mitigation
in their climate scenarios, giving a narrower range of emissions
futures than would be considered by those responsible for
choosing levels of mitigation. Still other users may need
simple standard emissions scenarios as inputs to climate-model
intercomparisons, or specified reduction targets as starting
points for back-casting or feasibility analysis. Some users
3
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may need scenarios reflecting a wider range than presently
considered of socio-economic conditions relevant to emissions
and mitigation capacity, including unfavorable futures such
as development failures, extended global recessions, or
breakdowns of international cooperation.
Moreover, for no users do these core variables meet
all scenario needs. Describing key uncertainties will
require additional characteristics, which may be described
qualitatively, unavailable as model outputs, and drawn from
multiple knowledge domains including local sources and users.
Some users, such as energy managers assessing investment
strategies, may wish to develop these additional scenario
elements confidentially.
5. More useful scenarios: transparency can
substitute for representation
The variety of decision-makers’ scenario needs calls for a re-
examination of standard practice in what goes into scenarios
and how they are produced, including the canon that users
should be intensively engaged in key stages of scenario
development. When feasible, such engagement ensures
that scenarios are useful, and that assumptions and values
embedded in them are understood and accepted by users. Even
in global-change settings, such engagement is valuable when
scenarios serve an identified, sufficiently homogeneous group
of decision-makers, such as those responsible for managing
some specific area of impact or managers of a particular set
of energy investments.
But for widely used emissions and climate scenarios, such
engagement is usually infeasible. Users are too diverse to
engage an adequately representative group, while involving a
few who are available or known risks biasing scenarios toward
their perspectives and interests. But without such engagement,
how are users to understand what each scenario means, how
closely its assumptions match their needs, and how they might
use it? The only alternative is for developers to provide
fully detailed and explicit accounts of scenarios’ underlying
reasoning and assumptions, so users can understand them,
revise them if they wish, and make an informed choice whether
and how to use them. While such transparency in scenarios
is widely advocated, it is rarely achieved, perhaps because
communicating such extreme detail is difficult, laborious,
and sometimes contentious and embarrassing. But allowing
users to make informed choices, and empowering them to
augment centrally provided scenario elements with additional
information they judge necessary, requires such a ‘traceable
account’ of how each scenario was produced, including areas
of weakness, low confidence, and disagreement.
A particularly controversial area for such transparency
is the uncertainty judgments that underlie the presentation
of a set of scenarios. Developers commonly present a
few scenarios with no information about their judgments of
associated probabilities. This practice, developed in domains
where scenarios include major qualitative elements and users
are involved in scenario development, has been transferred to
global change, where these conditions usually do not hold—
in particular, where most the most prominent scenario output
is often a set of emissions trajectories. Scenario teams have
declined to answer even such seemingly simple questions as
whether they judge emissions more likely to lie in the middle
than at the ends of the envelope of all scenarios, and how likely
they are to lie outside the envelope entirely. Instead, they have
characterized the meaning of scenarios in opaque terms, e.g.,
that scenarios in a set are ‘all plausible’ or ‘equally sound’.
This approach has been criticized for concealing probabilistic
reasoning that must underlie the decision to identify a scenario
with a particular emissions trajectory or to identify a particular
scenario as ‘sound’ or ‘plausible’, and for failing to provide
information that some users need.
In other domains, the arguments for avoiding explicit
probability judgments are strong: such judgments are
technically intractable for complex or qualitative scenarios,
and users involved in scenario creation are unlikely to need
them. But these arguments have less force for global
change, where it is feasible to provide such judgments for
relevant emissions ranges spanned by scenarios, and the
vast pool of potential users needs such explicit, structured
communication devices. In addition to advancing the general
goal of transparency in scenario reasoning and assumptions,
the attempt to articulate explicit probability judgments may
help focus and deepen deliberations even when users are
engaged. But the strongest reason for explicit probability
judgments is that they can aid inclusion of extremes or worst-
cases in publicly conveyed scenarios. A striking weakness
of current practice is that scenarios rarely consider extremes,
although these are often of greatest importance to decision-
makers. For example, no public scenarios have examined
world development failure and growing inequity to support
analysis of how such dismal trends would effect emissions and
the ability to reduce them. Similarly, sea-level rise scenarios
in the most recent IPCC assessment explicitly excluded the
possibility of loss of a major ice sheet. Such extremes
are normally avoided because without explicit probability
information to convey their special status as unlikely extremes,
their mere inclusion risks making them appear likely. Explicit
probability judgments can allow consideration of such tails
of the distribution with less risk that they dominate decision-
making.
6. More useful scenarios: a cross-scale scenario and
assessment network
The diversity of users’ needs from scenarios, with some
widely shared and some highly diverse elements, also calls
for a new approach to the processes of generating and using
global-change scenarios. The core emissions and climate-
change elements needed by many users are best provided
through centralized national or international processes, which
can provide required technical and modeling expertise, high-
cost resources, and consistency of reasoning and assumptions
across scenarios and regions. The process can rely on
specially convened groups as in past exercises, or solicitation
of independently produced scenarios meeting standards of
transparency and documentation, as now proposed—with
4
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either process providing the broader range of socio-economic
assumptions and the greater transparency discussed above.
Beyond these common elements, scenario needs are so
unique to their specific responsibilities and contexts that no
central process can meet them all. These centralized processes
must be augmented by a network of decentralized assessment
and scenario capabilities, which can draw on and interpret
centrally provided scenario elements, models, and methods,
and link them to local expertise, context, and needs to support
assessments and decision-making in diverse setting and at
diverse scales. The US agricultural extension system has been
proposed as a potential model for the mix of centralized and
distributed expertise, resources, and responsibilities in such a
cross-scale network (Cash 2000).
7. Conclusion: the need for scenarios, their challenge
to public debate
Responsible decision-making on global-change issues requires
scenario-based reasoning. The alternative to scenarios, which
stipulate assumptions about key uncertainties explicitly, is
to make implicit, unexamined assumptions about future
conditions—often that they will resemble the present. This
is not likely to produce better decisions. The main
alternative approaches proposed for global-change decisions—
e.g., seeking decision strategies that are robust to major
uncertainties, and constructing pictures of desired future
conditions and examining how to get there—do not avoid the
need to specify relevant future trends.
Changes to global-change scenario practice such as are
proposed here are likely to make scenarios more useful for
decision-making. They are not likely, however, to make
scenarios less controversial or less subject to attacks like those
leveled against scenarios in the IPCC and the US National
Assessment. Global-change scenarios are controversial
because they are powerful public framers of the issue, and
because they act as proxies for the need to take action. Political
actors with strong views on desired action have an interest
in attacking scenarios that challenge their preferred course.
Consequently, opponents of emission limits attack high-growth
scenarios as biased or unrealistic and highlight low-growth
ones, while proponents of limits do the opposite. It is easy
to attack a scenario, by selecting one scenario in isolation,
exaggerating its predictive intent, describing it as ‘speculative’
or ‘unscientific’, and digging into its details to find elements
that appear implausible or erroneous—which can usually be
found.
Defending scenarios against such attacks is more difficult.
In doing so, it is important to avoid the temptation to deny or
suppress scenarios’ inevitably speculative character. Doing so
by highlighting scenarios’ quantitative and seemingly scientific
elements in their creation makes them less useful, and risks
disguising the assumptions and judgments that must be made
in scenarios as technical matters subject to scientific resolution.
Doing so is also futile, because those attacking a scenario can
easily demonstrate how its plausibility ultimately rests on its
creators’ judgments.
Rather, a more effective and honest response requires re-
focusing on sets of scenarios to represent key uncertainties,
explaining that such assumptions are required for responsible
decision-making under uncertainty, and—hardest of all—
conveying that calling scenarios ‘speculative’ or ‘unscientific’
is correct, but beside the point. Scenarios stipulate future
conditions that science cannot specify, so they always blend
knowledge with judgment and speculation. Such a program
of political and public education is not easy, but is necessary.
Its basic message is that scenario-based reasoning is not an
alternative to speculation. It is an approach that seeks to
make speculation more disciplined, more anchored to scientific
knowledge where it is available, and more transparent, which
is essential to informing global-change decision-making.
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